Intellectual capital: direction, not blind faith by Chaharbaghi, Kazem et al.
  
 
University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Chaharbaghi, Kazem., Cripps, Sandy. 
Article Title: Intellectual capital: direction, not blind faith 
Year of publication: 2006 
Citation: Chaharbaghi, K., Cripps, S. (2006) ‘Intellectual capital: direction, not blind 
faith’ Journal of Intellectual Capital 7 (1) 29 - 42 

































Intellectual capital: direction, not blind faith 
 
Kazem Chaharbaghi and Sandy Cripps 





This study questions the coupling of “intellectual” with “capital” and the assumption 
that such a coupling legitimises measurement. It suggests this coupling presents 
intellectual capital as an uncontested construction that attracts a broad audience. 
However, this study lays bare intellectual capital by revealing its contestability and 
multiple meanings using rational and non-rational management perspectives as 
examples. Such contestability can be seen both as a strength and weakness in 
making intellectual capital a meaningful or meaningless construction. Using a 
metalectic framework, a process is presented that exposes a variety of attitudes of 
mind so that the integration of rational and non-rational management perspectives 
becomes a possibility. Using this framework, intellectual labour is captured operating 
within an eco-work system, which relies on the human attributes of independency 
and interdependency working simultaneously. It suggests that intellectual capital can 
only indicate a direction when imagination, creativity and learning are at work. The 
intention is not to provide yet another management model that will control or change 
people’s behaviours. This paper simply presents an alternative thinking process that 
accommodates a variety of attitudes of mind and argues that such a process is more 





Intellectual capital as a construction has recently emerged in response to a number 
of recognitions that are changing the assumptions upon which organisations are built 
and run. First, the world is viewed as becoming less labour intensive, less material 
intensive, less energy intensive, but more knowledge intensive. It is assumed that 
“knowledge” has a financial impact as knowledge intensive organisations are 
considered to feature a higher productivity level and innovation rate. Second, there 
are increasing criticisms of traditional accounting methods such as balance sheets, 
which look backwards and at tangible assets only, and a growing demand for 
effective management of intangibles. The new management mantra of intellectual 
capital as the cure of all organisational crises in tricky markets is, therefore, partly a 
reaction to a dissatisfaction with the rate of success of conventional financial 
 2 
measures and its financially based instruments. Guthrie et al (2003) divide the 
perspectives of intellectual capital into three branches: accounting, management 
control and management. The accounting perspective focuses on specific indicators 
of intangibles (e.g. research and development expenses, training costs, goodwill, 
advertising, patents, brands, customer satisfaction, etc) for the purpose of their 
capitalisation. The management control perspective emphasises how these 
indicators can be used for management control purposes whilst the management 
perspective calls forth a new managing approach where intangibles are in the 
limelight. What is common amongst these perspectives is the new belief that 
intellectual capital is the key driver of sustainable organisational performance and 
that it better reflects the actual worth of an organisation. This is shifting the focus of 
management from the tangibles to the intangibles under the auspices of the old 
doctrine of “what gets measured gets managed”. Such an approach, however, makes 
intellectual capital meaningless and devalues its nature which is intangible. The key 
consideration is that it is impossible, and undesirable, to reduce intellectual capital to 
a calculable number that establishes whether an organisation’s intellectual capital 
has increased or diminished. This is because measurement schemes are jumbles of 
subjective evaluations and opinions presented as objective phenomena which can 
serve to mask what really matters. Measurement thus transforms data into biased 
organisational conversations about what is valuable. It is simply a soft method of 
intervention, a less visible tool of organisational re-direction and altered meanings; it 
is not an explanation (Mouritsen 2004). 
 
The accountants and rational managers, who are obsessed with numbers and 
believe in that part of the theocracy of scientific management which claims truth is 
revealed by measurement, may argue that intellectual capital is too important to be 
left to chance because “knowledge” has a financial impact in the perceived, 
emerging, post-industrial and knowledge intensive society. This context, it is argued, 
is driving and creating the integration of the measurement of intellectual capital 
(Mourtisen et al 2001). Yet the assumption that measurement of intellectual capital 
has positive organisational effects lacks empirical confirmation (Marr et al 2003). 
Whilst the current importance of intellectual capital is associated with the competitive 
advantage of distinctive competence (Selznick 1957, Prahalad and Hamel 1990), 
how this occurs and what conditions can encourage it are less clear. Neither is it 
clear whether Intellectual capital is simply the sum of organisational knowledge or 
something more esoteric about value (Sanchez et al 2000). Indeed Chaminade and 
Johanson (2003) contend that culture alters assumptions about knowledge, its 
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creation and its implementation. Whist those intent on measurement are making 
attempts to reduce the components of intellectual capital to generic factors, others 
have recognised that global dependency relies on a deep and wide interpretation of 
intellectual capital. This presents opportunities to transcend traditional symbolic order 
(Allee 2000), replacing control with conditions for cooperation, and in so doing, 
improving cooperation (Thorbjornsen and Mouritsen 2003). 
 
The problem of intellectual capital is thus created by the technology of management 
employed to assess the sharing of knowledge between the individual, the team and 
the organisation. Any attempt to apply measurement and its disembodied logic to the 
meaning of intellectual capital eliminates emotion and feeling from it, replacing its 
representation with meaningless numbers. Whilst such arguments are 
understandable when placed in the context of their self-importance, legitimising them 
will only reduce intellectual capital to a label behind which accountants and rational 
managers can hide their limitations. In other words, it will not instigate any useful, 
meaningful action. Given these considerations, the legitimacy of measurement 
schemes in the context of intellectual capital is so dubious that makes them unworthy 
of serious scholarly attention. A more fruitful inquiry, however, would be to reveal 
how such perspectives determine potential meanings for intellectual capital in 
reinforcing their legitimacy. The outcome of such an inquiry will shift the emphasis of 
intellectual capital from measurement to recognition. For this purpose, intellectual 
capital can be considered, for example, from the perspective of those who believe in 
a disembodied world where objectivity is achievable, as well as from the perspective 
of those who believe in an embodied world, where all emotion and meaning is 
situated. 
 
In shifting the emphasis from measurement to recognition through developing 
alternative thinking about intellectual capital, it is also crucial to question why 
intellectual capital as a construction is attracting considerable degree of interest 
amongst scholars and practitioners. The starting point for addressing this question in 
this study has been an assumption: that, intellectual capital enjoys a strong rhetorical 
appeal, and like other fashionable fads, it links together the characteristics of 
simplicity and ambiguity. Intellectual capital is accepted with a generally positive and 
highly esteemed status. Perhaps this general attitude is admirable and even noble 
because who could deny anything that is intellectual in nature and the importance of 
intellectuals who use their mind creatively. Through its intellectual labour, humankind 
has indeed been able to overcome many of its own natural limitations. For example, 
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it has enabled people to develop technologies to fly without wings, and defy nature 
itself by prolonging their mortal existence. This study does not suggest that 
intellectual labour is unimportant but contends that the view of intelligence as capital 
faces fundamental problems with measurability due to its ambiguity. This is 
significant because it is not possible to explain how such a capital can be 
accumulated and what results such an accumulation will produce. Ambiguous, 
fashionable fads with a strong rhetorical appeal, that attract a broad audience, are 
also essentially contested concepts with no fixed meaning (MacIntyre 1973). Their 
vagueness lends obvious appeal to those who would seek to use it in legitimising 
themselves in furthering their interests. In other words, intellectual capital, like other 
essentially contested concepts such as education, democracy and freedom, that 
have multiple meanings and usage, is a weasel word, slippery and elusive that can 
be used in different ways to obscure and deliberately exclude a wide mix of agendas 
and practices. Scepticism about the view of intelligence as capital is therefore 
necessary because the ambiguity that surrounds intellectual capital may deliver 
alternative outcomes from those promised by its advocates. 
 
This paper will demonstrate the limitations of intellectual capital as a construction 
when it is viewed through either the rational or non-rational management 
perspectives. It reveals that it is the assumptions that underpin each perspective that 
enable the existence of such limitations. It also shows that it is possible to make 
these two seemingly competing perspectives complementary through a metalectic 
approach. Such an approach provides a richer and broader meaning for intellectual 
capital by locating both perspectives on their strengths and by giving equal 
importance to them whilst endlessly remaining critical of them. 
 
Intellectual capital: a rational management perspective 
 
Within the managerial mind frame, rationality is a deliberately constructed abstraction 
and represents an ideal type. According to Weber (1949: 90): 
 
An ideal type is framed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct…In its 




Rational management consists of a pre-determined, “problem” solving, goal-oriented 
strategy which assumes that the whole is a closed environment immune to any 
changing conditions, thereby excluding any emergent properties. Such an abstraction 
is characterised and described in terms of a disembodied whole where each inner 
part is unique. A means-end hierarchy ensures the goals revealed by the problem 
solving strategy it creates are achieved through the domination of that whole-part 
hierarchy. For these problem-solving strategies to function, individuals are assumed 
to be programmable. 
 
Economic interests, in particular cost reduction, expressed as the elimination of 
waste, drive the rational management model (Homans 1961). It has efficiency as its 
primary value, guiding decisions and actions. It places faith in technologies, tools and 
techniques that it is argued maximise output and minimise effort, energy and time. 
The rational management model is based on the assumption that it is possible to 
create an objective world that can be explained in terms of means-ends and cause-
effect relationships, where action is deemed goal driven, rule-based and calculative. 
This assumption, however, only holds true if predictability can be achieved. As a 
choosable world cannot be predictable and a predictable world cannot be choosable, 
in order to function, the rational management model requires the removal of 
differences between individuals, or groups of individuals, within an organisation. For 
this purpose, a unitary perspective emphasising sameness or uniformity must be 
enforced through its logic, language and measurement. This means suppressing 
individual’s emotions from action and judgement by specifying what rational 
individuals will do in a variety of situations. Rational management is therefore a 
reductionist model of thinking in that it uses a classification process to reduce the 
plethora of options and interpretations. In this way, the rational management model 
categorises the behaviour of individuals and makes them powerless by their 
judgement of those behaviours. The behaviour of individuals becomes measured 
against these constructed standards and not by the thinking that determines 
individual action. Thus, individuals loose their individualism by being type cast as 
“conformist” or “deviant”, “good workers” or “troublemakers”. To ensure that the 
unitary perspective is maintained, surveillance has to be tight. As a result, 
measurement, monitoring and control increase in intensity. The assumption is that 
performance is the result of conformity. Any deviance from this choice, this one 
“truth” or one “best” way of doing things, is judged as irrational which by implication is 
untrue, bad or unworthy, and therefore becomes a site for increased control and 
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For this whole to be sustainable, the discourse of the rational management model is 
soaked in power relations, where the relationships within it are biased towards rank. 
Heirarchical communication are asymmetrical, emphasising one way relationships 
such that when two individuals relate, one is designated the "super-ordinate" and the 
other the "sub-ordinate". The super-ordinate who at all times maintains a higher 
ranking thus has control over all lower ranks. Authority is used to make sub-ordinates 
docile, efficient and economically active. The primary task of the super-ordinates is to 
establish, enforce and maintain the legitimacy of rationality, the criteria for which is 
defined and imposed by them. A supervisory control process thus drives the problem 
solving strategy by specifying choices, determining actions, and monitoring the 
actions that these choices determine, whilst factors such as emotions, feelings and 
meanings have to be specified and accounted for, or excluded. Whilst the 
subordinates might be able to see the relevance of the means and ends of their own 
part defined for them by the hierarchy, the division of parts ensures that they cannot 
recognise the significance of one part to another. The self-legitimising, self-
reinforcing cycle of the ends justifying the means and the means justifying the ends, 
can therefore potentially lead to conflicts between the parts. In the light of such 
conflicts, any function that fails to achieve the pre-determined goals is labelled “fault”, 
“error” or “failure” and it is only this that is broadcast upward. Thus, one of the main 
roles of super-ordinates in the hierarchy is that of a “fault finder” and successful 
hunting becomes the grounds on which these rational managers can accumulate 
acclaim. As a feedback loop for communicating disbelief and disquiet does not exist, 
such voices cannot be heard. It is therefore not surprising that rationally managed 
organisations such as factories resemble prisons and prisons resemble factories 
(Foucault 1977). 
 
The rational management model is thus a normalising, disciplinary technology aimed 
at transforming the polyphony of voices within an organisation into a solo so that 
regulation and order can be imposed over diversity. Through this normalising 
process, individuals’ choices for action become aligned with the organisational goals 
and the meaning of those choices becomes reduced to their capabilities to carry out 
what is expected. Thus, individuals can only use expressions such as, “I can”, that is 
to say “I am competent to do so”, or “I cannot”, that is to say “I am not competent to 
do so” and the language of obligation such as “I must” (Schabracq and Cooper 
1998). This technology allows the control of the individual and the control of choice, 
making individuals thoughtless in the name of economic interests. From the rational 
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management perspective, “intellectual capital” only becomes meaningful when it is 
defined in a way that gives an illusion of inclusion and excludes choice by allowing 
the dominant discourse of rational management to impose what kind of intellectual 
labour is legitimate. This illusion serves to hide a preference for a disembodied 
worldview and an intolerance of the embodied world. The illusion of inclusion is 
necessary to obscure the crucial difference that exists between the intellectual labour 
that is driven by the rational criteria and objectives of management and the non-
rational criteria and objectives that are born out of individual’s intellectual labour. 
Unclear semantics thus conditions language in a way that disguises the distinction 
between sufficient, causal conditions and necessary, enabling conditions. This 
trickery is best demonstrated by the following treatment of intellectual capital 
provided by Stewart (1997: xix), one of its main advocates: 
 
By intellectual capital I don't mean a clutch of PhDs locked up in a lab somewhere. 
Nor do I mean intellectual property (such as patents and copyrights), though that is 
one part of intellectual capital. Intellectual capital is the sum of everything everybody 
in a company knows that gives it a competitive edge. Unlike the assets with which 
business people and accountants are familiar – land, factories, equipment, cash – 
intellectual capital is intangible. It is the knowledge of a workforce: the training and 
intuition of a team of chemists who discover a billiondollar new drug or the know-how 
of workmen who come up with a thousand different ways to improve the efficiency of 
a factory. It is the electronic network that transports information at warp speed 
through a company, so that it can react to the market faster than its rivals. It is the 
collaboration – the shared learning – between a company and its customers, which 
forges a bond between them that brings the customer back again and again. 
 
Implicit within the above treatment of intellectual capital that commits itself to a 
tangible being are the conceptual assumptions that it is possible to develop further 
productive relations by capturing and rationalising non-instrumental, non-
representable, non-rational minds through formalist and instrumentalist descriptions 
of rational structures and the language practices of rational management 
(Fayol1949). This perplexing treatment of intellectual capital assumes knowledge to 
be transmitted and exchanged through a medium that can be stored, atomically 
accumulated and mined. Intellectual labour thus becomes reduced to a series of 
predictable steps and knowledge becomes reduced to the technology that can share 
it. In this way, intellectual capital is assumed to form the basis of productive relations 
that depend upon the representability, transferability and storability of knowledge. 
However, the relevance of such knowledge can be potentially questionable and 
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problematic in a changing environment. This is because knowledge cannot be 
separated form language, and language cannot be separated from the knower, 
whose knowledge is imbedded in their historical and social contexts. The work of 
Michel Foucault (1972 and 1981), “the archaeology of knowledge” and “the order of 
discourse” provides further clues. In his work, Foucault gave the term “discursive 
formation” and “discursive practices” to the analysis of the ways in which institutions 
establish orders of truth or what is accepted as “reality” in a given community or 
society. In this perspective, an established discursive formation is created by a 
dominant discourse that governs truth as a regime, which in turn shapes the 
conditions for “knowing” within a given context. Thus, the limits of codes, conventions 
and habits of language that reflect a given discourse are the limits of knowledge of 
the community or society holding that discourse and vice versa. In a changing 
environment, this implies that, by thinking of intellectual capital in rational terms, 
management can become the victims of this logic through which they strive to 
squeeze out more efficiency (Taylor 1911). 
 
The treatment of this logic by those who hold the rational management perspective is 
valid within the context that makes such logic relevant e.g. when the environment is 
stable and where the ends are clear, agreed and known. However, those who hold 
the rational management perspective suffer from a fixation of belief that makes them 
assume that their logic is valid in all contexts. It is the context free application of this 
logic that renders it meaningless in other circumstances. The adverse consequences 
derived from the rational management model being misapplied are assumed to be 
unintended consequences of the intended action but they are avoidable. In which 
case, they cannot be mistaken and are therefore intended. For Mills (1959), the 
increasing rationalisation of society, where families as well as factories, leisure as 
well as work become parts of a functionally rational totality, is not necessarily a 
means of increased freedom for the individual or for the society. It rather subjects 
individuals to uncontrolled and irrational forces that make them not only increasingly 
self-rationalised but also increasingly uneasy as they are discouraged from using 
their own independent judgment. Thus, there is a ghost amongst the participants of 
the rational management model that constantly haunts them and which they fear. 
This mysterious ghost can only reveal its presence when the participants choose to 
step outside of their fixation of belief to access an alternative perspective. 
 
Intellectual capital: a non-rational management perspective 
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Rational behaviour cannot be reduced to managerial rationality. Behaviour can be 
non-rational in managerial and yet rational in extra-managerial terms (i.e. 
managerially irrational and non-managerially rational). It is possible to develop an 
alternative way of thinking about intellectual capital through a non-managerially 
rational or non-rational management perspective. The logic of the non-rational 
management perspective instigates trust and diversity as opposed to the disciplinary, 
normalizing technology for individual regulation and collective control used in the 
rational management perspective. 
 
The non-rational management model is characterised and described in terms of an 
embodied whole, where each inner part contributes to the determination of the whole. 
From this perspective, organisations are seen as a nexus of social treaties created 
by a diversity of interests. Trust is the key value and guiding principle driving the 
nonrational management model. It places faith in the capability of individuals to 
maximise their potential and determine what needs to be done. From this 
perspective, social cohesion is perceived not through sameness or uniformity but 
through unity in diversity. The non-rational management model is based on the 
assumption that organisational life is about making choices in a world where truth is a 
nebulous notion. Action and choice are not given; instead they are derived from the 
interactive process between different interests. Variation is seen both as a positive 
moral social value and as a survival mechanism where the world is uncertain and 
processes evolve. The assumption is that performance is the result of two 
tendencies: an integrative tendency, so that individuals work together as a whole and 
a self-assertive tendency, where individuals retain their autonomy within the whole. 
The bottom-up representative structure consists of autonomous actors creating 
together the goals through a process of finding unity in diversity and through shared 
principles and policies that provide channels of mediation. 
 
The non-rational management model therefore represents an ecological model of 
thinking in that it celebrates mutual dependency and interdependency. It supports the 
notion that reality is uncontrolled, and that individuals and organisations are located 
and embedded in a dynamic, uncertain context. That it is not possible to know in 
advance when journeying along an unknown road that it might lead to a dead-end. 
Learning is derived from the history associated with trial and error processes causing 
change to be incremental and choice to be limited (Nelson and Winter 1982). What 
emerges is a track record through which change can be traced. Choices are 
sometimes planned, sometimes unrealised and sometimes emergent (Mintzberg 
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1994). Individual learning is both conditioned by the technology used to assess it and 
an individual’s response to that technology and its meaning (Weick 1995). However, 
whilst a shared understanding may be developed and social order may exist this 
does not imply that meaning is universal. Individuals are quite capable of doing one 
thing and thinking another. Thus, knowledge and knowing are independent of one 
another and determined by individual meaning. As a result, differences rather than 
consensus is the state of play. 
 
In this ecological model each individual has an interdependent and antagonistic 
relationship with the context within which they are placed. These tensions are 
balanced by the trust that exists between individuals, where trust is considered to be 
the self-assertive state of being responsible for the conscientious performance of 
some task and the integrative state which allows others to use or do something in the 
belief that they will behave responsibly and honestly. Trust is thus a condition 
triggered by different emotional and rational intelligences shared with others (Uphoff, 
2000). It functions through a belief system where, based on its etymology, the Latin 
‘credo’, belief becomes “I give my heart to”, an emotionally comfortable position in 
which the individual is both engaged and involved. This psychological treaty ensures 
that individuals feel important, valued and enriched by their work experience (the 
word “treaty” rather than “contract” is used because the relationship is much more 
fluid than “contract” suggests). Schein (1965) describes this psychological treaty as a 
relationship that requires rewards and conditions over and above the pay structure to 
encourage the commitment, creativity and flexibility required of employees. The 
psychological relationship is thus always emotionally and individually constructed. Its 
composition involves a nexus of individually determined treaties with others at work. 
Such complexity suggests that the more power is disbursed the less likely 
convergent psychological treaties will become (Rousseau, 2003) because empathy 
and trust will have to be individually believed rather than socially constructed. For the 
whole to be sustainable, a pluralist perspective is present in the logic, language and 
success criteria of the non-rational management model. Individuals use expressions 
such as, “I will” or “I will not” and the language of belonging such as “we believe”. 
Bottom-up representative structures are symmetrical, where information flows both 
ways. When two individuals relate both are "expert" in their own working context and 
both are able to self-regulate their behaviour and act autonomously to specify choice, 
determine action and monitor the outcomes. The non-rational management model 
thus serves a self-regulating technology aimed at transforming the polyphony of 
voices within an organisation into a symphony where self-regulation replaces the 
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conductor. Through this self-regulating process individuals’ choices for action 
become aligned with the organisational goals.  
 
Whilst the sticking point for the rational managers is cost, expressed as the 
elimination of waste that paves the way to the maximisation of output and the 
minimisation of effort, energy and time, the watch word for those holding the non-
rational management perspective is investment. This distinction between cost and 
investment is crucial for the recognition of the effort that “wasted” intellectual labour 
takes combined with the belief that such “waste” is often not “wasteful” but instead 
represents an investment because it is a necessary, unavoidable part of the process 
of the development of new ideas and creating new choices. This contestability of the 
notion of waste is a good example of how exclusive fixations of belief can be. Waste, 
for example, assumes a particular meaning for rational managers, which is that of 
wasted effort and energy, which according to their criteria of success has to be 
eliminated. A powerful example of how waste can have different meanings can be 
seen in nature. In ecological terms, waste is an integral part of the conservation of a 
sustainable environment. Cohen (1977: 11) describes this natural process as follows: 
 
Female starlings on average lay 16 eggs in a life time. Only two of these go on to 
breed. This means a pair of parents in one generation makes a pair of parents in the 
next generation. For every pair of starlings that breed, 14 die. A female frog typically 
lays about 10,000 eggs in her life. Of those, 9,998 die before breeding. A female cod 
lays about 40 million eggs in her life, of which 39,999,998 die before breeding. Nearly 
all-wild creatures actually die without ever breeding, mainly by becoming food for 
other creatures. This indicates that the ecology is a necessary part of reproduction, 
and the cod and frog and sparrow are necessary parts of the ecology. 
 
Such natural profligacy is also present in the creative thinking and innovation 
process, the ignorance of which makes organisations’ sustainability fragile. A thought 
or physical experiment that does not work is an essential and natural by-product of 
successful exploration that should not be confused with careless work. Thomas Alva 
Edison’s reported observation arising from his experience of inventing the light bulb 
provides some clues to this natural by-product. According to Edison, “the 
accomplishment of an inventor takes 1% inspiration, 99% perspiration”. It therefore 
follows that without exploration, experimentation and the inevitable errors that 




From the perspective of non-rational management, “intellectual capital” is therefore a 
consequence of exploring and searching for possibilities together with the 
accumulation of, and sharing of, information and ideas. The purpose of this process 
is to advance, preserve, disseminate and apply ideas where “error” is perceived as a 
natural consequence of the process of innovation and not as the consequence of 
individual mistakes. Thus “error” is supported through mutual respect, which removes 
fear and suspicion whilst strengthening social cohesion that determines how robust 
and unified the organisation is. In this way, organisations develop a strong sense of 
identity, coupled with shared values and beliefs, whilst providing their members with 
a strong sense of community, making them more cohesive than ones without these 
qualities. Strongly cohesive organisations are thought better able to face the 
challenges posed by social, economic and technological forces through innovations 
of its members, providing it with greater choice than its rational management 
counterpart. 
 
Intellectual capital: a metalectic perspective 
 
Through the process of revealing the meaning of intellectual capital from two 
seemingly competing perspectives, this study has thus far been able to demonstrate 
that the application of the rational and non-rational management perspectives causes 
organisations to be treated like factories and laboratories respectively. The key 
question to be addressed here is not whether a belief about intellectual capital is 
reasonable or unreasonable but whether it is maintained on shaky grounds.  
 
The rational and non-rational management models each have limitations, the 
understanding of which will lead to its alternative. For example, the rational 
management thinkers consider that releasing diversity results in fragmented 
organisational goals and that without rational management, the exercise of choice by 
individuals can only lead to variable, random outcomes. They also argue that 
increased choice forces individuals to take personal responsibility for decisions that 
turn out to be less than perfect. As a result, they fear choice and freedom. According 
to rational management thinkers, this dilemma is well known – it is like an individual 
who is not quite sure where to park in an empty car park. Thus by freedom people 
actually mean escaping from having to make choices. Non-rational management 
thinkers, on the other hand, argue that conformity to one choice and rational controls 
suppress integrative and self-assertive tendencies that they consider to be the key 
drivers of performance. Given these considerations, the rational and non-rational 
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management models appear to contradict each other. In resolving this contradiction, 
it is important to recognise that although the rational and non-rational management 
models may appear to be opposites, they support each other’s existence. This is 
because to view two opposites on the same level is to generate a contradiction. But 
since these opposites are not of the same type, or level, they create no 
contradictions. The rational and non-rational management models are similar at a 
deeper, more obscure level of analysis in that they both see the common interest of 
the organisation in terms of sustainable organisational performance. At this deeper 
level of analysis an alternative thinking about choice can be established where truth 
is in transient such that it is possible to engage with the struggle of polar opposites 
without commitment to a particular position. 
 
In making rational and non-rational management perspectives work with each other 
in opposition, it is necessary to recognise the artificial, socially constructed nature of 
the dichotomy between these two opposing perspectives. Such recognition paves the 
way to an alternative approach, which is henceforth referred to as metalectic. 
Metalectic thinking is a richer from of discourse that provides equal consideration to 
the rational and non-rational management perspectives. It is based on the 
recognition that the world of values is inconsistent because it is made up of 
antagonistic elements; that full commitment to opposing perspectives simultaneously 
is impossible, yet each demands total acceptance; that this is not a case of logical 
contradiction because it involves human values; and that it represents a kind of 
contradiction that lies at the heart of divergent agendas and practices. Based on 
these recognitions, metalectics can be considered as a way of describing choice-
making through three kinds of complimentary inquiries: namely, an empathetic 
enquiry, a sympathetic inquiry, and a dialectic inquiry applied dialectically. An 
empathetic inquiry attempts to understand as much as possible the value 
assumptions, hidden motivations and arguments of differing positions that support 
their rationale. A sympathetic inquiry does not deny the value assumptions of 
assertions, models or paradigms of others but nevertheless raises as many critical 
questions as possible about them. The idea is to play the devil’s advocate in the role 
of a critical friend and consider whether alternative arguments are more convincing. 
At the meta-theoretical level of exploration a dialectic applied dialectically goes 
beyond competing explanations to establish an alternative way of thinking about 
choice. A dialectic applied dialectically avoids the limitations of compromise that is 
reached by a dialectic that is applied objectively i.e. the weakening of polarised 
discourses through a process of denying the strengths of each position. This is an 
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important point because where compromise between argument positions is reached, 
individuals have no rational or good reason to accept or reject it. In other words, 
compromise is founded on an individual’s or a group’s participation in the solution but 
weak engagement with the struggle. The artistry involved in metalectics is exposed 
where the individual perceiving extremes in conflict uses their emotional intelligences 
such as empathy and sympathy to enable engagement with the struggle without 
commitment to a particular position. The aim is to keep polarised positions in the 
struggle of opposition because only through this struggle can true dialectic survive. It 
is therefore necessary to ensure that each discursive theme is not destroyed. A 
metalectic discourse is thus one that masters the art of argument using the strengths 
of each of the diverse argument positions to transform understanding. 
 
It therefore follows that metalectic thinkers actualise and potentialise. They not only 
exist to act but also exist to think and to doubt. Their reasoning is a composite of 
feelings and intellect. Their mode of thinking is temporary and contextual. In 
articulating concern they express care. They hold no allegiance to a belief. They 
stand within and without their experiences to consider what other possibilities there 
are. Whilst those who hold the rational and non-rational management perspectives 
emphasise the exclusive “either/or”, the metalectic thinkers are the selectors. They 
hold both alternative perspectives in their mind simultaneously, and by including the 
necessary division between the two perspectives, they free themselves from internal 
contradictions. In this way, they are able to select which opportunities should be 
exploited and exploit the opportunities they select in the process of exploring and 
searching for other opportunities. For this purpose, the three underpinning principles 
they uphold are: limitless opportunities that need to be exploited, selective retention 
of those ideas judged successful in the context within which they are placed, and 
disjointed journey towards discovery and invention. By allowing the law of the 
situation to govern them, when a successful innovation results in an opportunity, they 
emphasise the rational management model in order to maximise the exploitation of 
that opportunity. However, when this opportunity loses its relevance they shift the 
emphasis to the non-rational management model because of the need for creativity 
to challenge the assumptions upon which things are done and which no longer fit the 
reality. 
 
From a metalectic perspective, intellectual capital is not seen as a thing but as a 
process of choice-makers exploring possibilities, identifying necessities and 
exploiting opportunities when possibilities meet necessities. In other words, 
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intellectual capital lies at the heart of what organisations do with their individual and 
collective intellectual labour, the underlying element behind which is an invisible 
ability to select or choose. It can be argued that this perspective of intellectual capital 
takes the words “intellectual” and “capital” back to their Latin roots, and in doing so, 
legitimises their coupling. The word “intelligence”, and its variants “intelligent”, 
“intellect” and “intellectual”, derive from two Latin words, the preposition inter, 
meaning “between”, and the Latin verb lego, meaning “to choose or select”. 
According to its etymology, intelligence therefore consists in “choosing between”. 
Intelligent individuals are able to choose by virtue of having or revealing good 
judgment, keen insight and understanding. The Latin root of the word “capital” is 
capitalis, from the proto-Indo-European kaput, which means “head”, this being how 
wealth was measured e.g. the more heads of cattle, the better. The coupling of 
“intellectual” with “capital” when considered from a metalectic perspective leads to a 
similar interpretation, which is that the more possibilities there are to explore, the 
more necessities there are to identify and the more opportunities there are to exploit, 
the better. In other words, the more choice there is available and the greater the 




Intellectual capital has the potential of unveiling what really matters for the survival 
and sustainable performance of organisations in the perceived, emerging, post-
industrial and knowledge intensive society. This, however, requires a critical 
approach that provides an insight into the way different discourses are promoted and 
what their promoters gain from its use. Without the knowledge of such discourses it is 
not possible to make sense of intellectual capital. By adopting a critical approach, this 
study has argued that the measurement of intellectual capital does not have any 
explanatory power. The adoption of measurement of intellectual capital can only 
serve as a device for control through biasing organisational conversations and 
legitimising intervention when it assists management need for control. A radical 
alternative perspective of intellectual capital requires a fundamental change in the 
assumptions of what management is about and that forcing the discourse about 
intellectual capital into existing working frameworks will not bring about a change in 
the attitude of mind of managers or workers. The rational management perspective of 
intellectual capital has ignored, and made insignificant, the non-rational dimension, 
and vice versa. Those who hold the rational management perspective see individuals 
as possessions or connections that they can employ in order to exploit an existing 
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opportunity more efficiently or productively. Thus, their pursuit of intellectual capital is 
one of retention and exploitation for the purpose of serving economic interests. This 
begins with a successful innovation where a possibility meets a necessity thereby 
resulting in an opportunity that can be exploited. On the other hand, those who hold 
the non-rational management perspective are looking at potential through supporting 
variation in individual and collective efforts and aspirations. Their pursuit of 
intellectual capital swaps directing to enabling exploration so that a journey can take 
place for the purpose of discovery and invention. Like the reproduction in nature, they 
see regeneration deriving from the ecology of practice, the variety of possibilities. In 
this way, each perspective is making, and legitimising, unrealistic assumptions about 
the survival and sustainable performance of organisations. The major limitation of 
capturing and exploiting intellectual capital today has thus much to do with 
managerial mind frames, their limitations and denials. However, carrying on as 
before is not only a safe position but also a poor option. Rather than freezing 
incompatible doctrines, metalectic thinking enables the rational and non-rational 
management perspectives working together separately in a way that maintains their 
differences whilst celebrating and accommodating the strength of each. When the 
metalectic, rational and non-rational management perspectives are considered 
together, intellectual capital is like a flame within an upturned jar, the sustained 
burning of which is reliant upon the dependent and independent conditions within 
which it is placed. The burning of the flame alters the conditions that allow it to exist 
by consuming that on which it is dependent. Thus, if the context in which intellectual 
capital is placed is not appropriately energized, it will inevitably bring about its own 
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